The Development of the Role of the Spectator in Kant’s Thinking: The Evolution of the Copernican Revolution by Kuperus, Gerard
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences
2010
The Development of the Role of the Spectator in
Kant’s Thinking: The Evolution of the Copernican
Revolution
Gerard Kuperus
University of San Francisco, gkuperus@usfca.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/phil
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson
Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kuperus, Gerard, "The Development of the Role of the Spectator in Kant’s Thinking: The Evolution of the Copernican Revolution"
(2010). Philosophy. Paper 40.
http://repository.usfca.edu/phil/40
 1 
Pre-Print of: 
Gerard Kuperus “The Development of the Role of the Spectator in Kant’s Thinking: The 
Evolution of the Copernican Revolution” Idealistic Studies, Volume 40, 
1-2 (Spring/Summer 2010) 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper I discuss the development of Kant’s Critical project in the pre-critical writings. I am 
particularly focusing upon the problems that Kant encounters in developing the idea of a 
transcendental subject. This helps us to understand the radical nature of Kant’s project in which 
he not merely turns around the relationship between subject and object, but also has to redefine 
the nature of the subject. The development of the subject starts with Kant’s idea of an observer 
who actively determines qualities in the object (instead of passively taking it in). Ultimately the 
spectator becomes a subject that is constituted a priori independent of experience. In order to get 
to this idea of a subject Kant needs to overcome the tradition that in many ways still determines 
his thinking. 
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The Development of the Role of the Spectator in Kant’s Thinking: The Evolution of the 
Copernican Revolutioni 
 
Introduction 
Kant’s Copernican Revolution in metaphysics brings a new way of thinking in which the subject 
becomes central. The difficulty in understanding this reversal of the roles of subject and object 
does not lie in the reversal of these roles, but rather in the constitution of a subject that can fully 
function in this new role. It is in this respect significant that it is not so much Kant’s idea of the 
Copernican Revolution that constituted a problem for Kant. As I argue in this paper, it is rather a 
radical new systematic approach that needed development. By following the development of the 
subject in Kant’s pre-critical writings we can understand the development of his systematic 
approach. Grasping this development and the difficulties he encountered will enable us to discern 
the most important elements of Kant’s new system. 
When considering Kant’s pre-critical writings, the secondary literature often emphasizes 
Kant’s early concern with the conditions and limitations of knowledge.ii Also Kant’s search for 
an adequate basis or method for metaphysics is often discussed.iii While I fully agree that these 
issues are important for Kant, I want to emphasize an important and ignored aspect of his early 
thinking, namely the role of the spectator that is slowly developed in the pre-critical writings.iv 
While a spectator is not identical to a subject, I the notion of the spectator Kant is developing the 
idea that the observer is not merely receiving data, but actively modifies the received data. While 
the subject of the critical project modifies intuitions by categorizing and judging, the spectator 
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discussed in, especially, the early pre-critical writings, modifies that which is observed through 
pre-suppositions. As such the observer is actively determining the qualities of objects. 
This insight that the subject is an active component in determining objects shows, on the one 
hand, that Kant’s revolution in metaphysics is not a sudden insight. More importantly, the fact 
that it takes Kant more than twenty years to formulate this insight into a systematic theory will 
tell us that it is very difficult for Kant to constitute a new theory that does not fall back into the 
old metaphysics. Especially his “failed” attempt in the dissertation – followed by eleven years of 
silence – bears witness to this difficulty. 
Before turning to Kant’s pre-critical writings, I will first briefly discuss Descartes’ influence 
upon the early Kant, in particular the idea to start from a clean slate. This discussion will make it 
possible to compare and contrast Kant’s initial Cartesian method with the transcendental method. 
It is my thesis in this regard that Kant’s method through his Dissertation of 1770 is not radical 
enough even while he claims to forget the past in a Cartesian fashion.  
 
The New Beginning: Descartes, Motion and Rest, and Swedenborg  
Descartes’ method of doubt, and the foundation of a ground that cannot be doubted, is often 
regarded as the starting-point of modernity. Descartes’ investigation of all former beliefs is – in 
line with the necessary methodological first-person perspective – presented as an investigation of 
his own beliefs, but its scope certainly lies beyond a private project, as he wants to establish 
something “firm and lasting in the sciences.”v This method of doubt itself creates the starting-
point of modernity by doubting everything that is thought prior to this moment. To doubt all 
previous beliefs implies to doubt all previous accomplishments in the sciences, or – to be more 
precise – to doubt the ground or foundation of those accomplishments. The doubt of these 
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foundations “will cause whatever has been built upon them to crumble of its own accord.”vi 
Hence, all scientific discoveries before this new era have no foundation and are reduced to 
nothing.vii 
Descartes’ method presupposes that we can make a radically new beginning in which the 
mistakes of the tradition are overcome. It is exactly this presupposition that can also be found in 
Kant’s earliest writings. In his New Theory of Motion and Rest, published in 1758, Kant asks the 
reader to take up Descartes’ disposition (Verfassung des Gemüts) to “forget all learned concepts 
and to take the road to truth guided by nothing but pure sound reason.” viii This Cartesian 
disposition is necessary for a new approach of the concepts of motion and rest. Traditionally 
motion is understood as a change of place, a quality of the object itself. Kant, in this essay, does 
not reject that motion is a change of place, but emphasizes that an object is in motion or in rest in 
relation to an external point of reference. In line with the Newtonian tradition, Kant then 
describes motion in terms of laws that are external to the object.  
Within this Newtonian framework, it seems that Kant seeks to establish motion and rest as 
dependent upon the observer, instead of determining motion and rest as qualities of the object, as 
the tradition does. “Now, I can relate a body to particular other objects which are surrounding it. 
When this relationship does not change, I would say that this body is at rest.”ix Kant adds that it 
is possible that when one changes the observation from the closest surroundings of an object to a 
more distant object, one finds motion, instead of rest. What occurs here is a change in 
perspective of the observer, which brings about a change in judgment. Kant illustrates such a 
change of perspective with the following example.x One is observing a ball lying on a table of a 
ship that supposedly lies tied to the banks. When one sees the ball resting on the table, one has to 
say that the ball is at rest. However, shortly after saying this, Kant continuous, “I look outside of 
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the ship to the bank and I realize that the line with which the ship was tied to the bank is untied 
and that the ship is slowly carried down the river; directly I say: no doubt the ball is moving from 
morning till evening along with the stream.”xi Through this change of perspective, in which the 
point of reference changes from the table to the banks of the river, the determination of the 
motion of the ball is changed. The next perspective taken into account by Kant is the perspective 
in which the point of reference is changed from the banks (or the earth) to the sun as the center of 
the universe: in relation to the system of the planets, the whole earth is “ from morning till 
evening in an even faster motion.”xii  When we take the movement of the earth in account, the 
ball (as well as the banks of the river) continuously move(s), even when the ship is tied to the 
banks.xiii These simple and quite obvious examples show something important: when we observe 
motion and rest we can relate an object to different surrounding objects, in this example to the 
table, the banks or to the sun.  
For a contemporary reader it might seem that the main reason, for Kant, to introduce the 
spectator here is to show the relativity or subjectivity involved in determining motion and rest. In 
observing an object and determining motion and rest the role of the observer is to actively relate 
an object to another point of reference. As such, the observer is, to a certain extent, determining 
whether an object is in motion or in rest. Accordingly, in changing his/her perspective the 
observer of the object makes different judgments about the motion or rest of the object. While 
such an argument would be entirely in line with Kant’s later thinking, in this essay he does not t 
take such a direction. Instead of emphasizing the subjectivity of motion and rest, he emphasizes 
merely a different kind of objectivity in the forms of the laws of nature that relate different 
objects. It is not the spectator’s presuppositions, i.e. his/her way of observing, or his/her 
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perspective, that determines whether the object is in motion or in rest. Instead, he argues that the 
object can be objectively determined in terms of physical forces.  
This conclusion is, perhaps, disappointing as it remains within the traditional framework. 
When Kant asks his reader to forget for a moment the concepts learned from the tradition, in 
order to let reason take the road to truth without any other guide, a contemporary reader will 
expect a more radical approach.xiv Kant’s Cartesian mode suggests that he is trying to rid 
philosophy of everything false by letting reason do its work in a pure manner. Descartes 
destroyed the tradition by pulling away its foundations; Kant proposes a radical amnesia in 
which one forgets the traditional concepts and perspectives that led to error, and held the truth at 
bay. This methodological step implies that the reader who observes Kant’s ideas has to change 
perspective. Kant asks the reader to forget the concepts of the tradition in order to be able to 
make such a change. Whether such a change is possible in the radical way Kant suggest here is 
doubtful – a topic I will return to later.  
While Kant’s conclusions in the essay on Motion and Rest are far removed from the new 
metaphysics he will ultimately establish, we can regard it as a first attempt to think through the 
subjectivity that lies in qualities of objects such as motion and rest. This idea is taken to a 
different level, in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (1766). In this 
essay Kant argues against the proof of the immortality of the soul (as we find it among others in 
Wolff) by comparing such a proof to the observations of Swedenborg, a so-called spirit-seer, i.e., 
someone who has contact with the spirit-world. Kant discusses this spirit-world as being part of 
the immaterial world (mundus intelligibilis) and as such he distinguishes this world from the 
material world. The immaterial world is not to be confused here with what he later discusses as 
the intelligible or noumenal realm of reason. The immaterial world is rather “dead matter” and is 
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the animating principle, “the ground of life”xv that constitutes the material world. In summary, 
this world consists of “ all created intelligence […] the sensible subjects in all animal species 
[…and…] all the other principles of life.”xvi  
As Kant is writing a polemic, he is not concerned with the claim that these spirits exist. 
Swedenborg’s (and Wolff’s) mistake is, however, that in his observations of the spirit-world he 
applies the concepts and categories of the material world. Here, one could say, Kant again 
emphasizes the role the observer has in determining that which s/he observes. Kant points out 
how Swedenborg, for example, applies spatial concepts of the corporeal world to the world of 
the spirits. Likewise, Wolff and others apply concepts of the material world in order to proof the 
immortality of the immaterial soul.  According to Kant, the respective concepts of these worlds, 
such as the concepts of space, are completely distinct from one another. In the spirit-world “the 
soul of someone in India may often be the closest neighbor of the soul of someone in Europe.”xvii 
The spatial concepts of the visible world can thus not be applied to this immaterial world. 
Swedenborg (as well as Wolff) does exactly this, by using the “human forms,” such as extension, 
in determining the relationship between the different spirits. The immaterial spirit-world and the 
material “human” world are, as such, confused. Swedenborg’s mistake is that he observes the 
spirits “as if he were looking at it with bodily eyes.”xviii  If the spirit-world exists (or if the soul is 
immortal) it must be a world (or realm) without extension, only perceivable through an inner 
sense. Swedenborg’s (and Wolff’s) observations are based upon the presupposition that there is a 
correspondence between the two worlds. Kant regards this correspondence as nonsense, or a 
sense-delusion. The spirit language (Geistersprache) is combined with ordinary language and in 
this combination the inner world is externalized.xix The role of the observer Swedenborg is not 
passive and objective, but he is active in determining the spirit-world by using the language and 
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determinations of the material world. How the spirit-world is determined, thus, depends upon the 
observer. As a polemic against, among others, Wolff Kant’s text argues for a clear separation of 
the material and immaterial world, whether the latter be the spirit-world or the soul. A confusion 
of these two worlds originates in false presuppositions about the nature of the immaterial world.  
In an attempt to overcome presuppositions that lead to confusion, Kant includes reflections 
upon his own method. In this regard he is particularly interested in finding a method in 
metaphysics that can take the “a priori path” without being directed to an “a posteriori point.”xx 
He criticizes those philosophers (presumably the philosophers who attempt to prove the 
immortality of the soul) who claim to start from pure, secluded contemplations (reinen, 
abgesonderten Betrachtungen)xxi while they already have completed the whole argument. Their 
theory (namely, that the soul is immortal) is already complete while they claim to start with some 
objective contemplations. Kant wants to find a metaphysical method that starts from a priori 
principles, without having an a posteriori end in mind.xxii As in the essay on motion and rest 
where Kant claimed to make a new start and asked his readers to forget the concepts of the 
tradition, Kant here again emphasizes the purity of his contemplations. In this case he 
emphasizes that there is not yet a completed theory. He attempts to make pure observations and 
let reason alone do its work on the way to truth by starting from pure a priori principles that are 
not part of an already completed theory. As Descartes in the Meditations wanted to abandon the 
mistakes of the tradition and start again from a firm foundation, Kant, in the Dreams-essay, takes 
pure a priori principles separated from a theory as the firm foundation of metaphysics.  
The purity of his metaphysical method is further discussed through a distinction between 
fictions or fabrications (Erdichtungen) and hypotheses.xxiii In “fictions” one simply invents a 
foundation “in a creative or chimaeric fashion.”xxiv These fabrications are based upon alleged or 
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pretended (angebliche) experiences (as in ghost stories). Such experiences lack “agreement and 
uniformity” and are hence “incapable of serving as foundation [Fundament] to any law of 
experience.”xxv Kant opposes these fabrications to the hypotheses used in natural science. In 
using a hypothesis “one does not invent fundamental forces [Grundkräfte]; one rather connects 
the forces, which one already knows through experience, in a manner which is appropriate to the 
phenomena.”xxvi While both fictions and hypotheses can be based upon experience, the kind of 
experiences that can form the foundation of fictions lack agreement and uniformity. Hypotheses, 
instead, are based upon experiences that are universal and agreed upon, i.e. experiences that can 
be brought under laws of experience that are “unanimously accepted by the majority of the 
people.”xxvii Kant thinks here of tangible objects – as opposed to spirits or souls – that can be 
experienced by everyone and is done so in a uniform manner. Even though everyone can 
experience objects in different ways, there are certain laws of experience that are universal in the 
sense that they are accepted by the majority of the people. Kant proclaims his method as starting 
with these agreed and uniform experiences, followed by the discovery of the fundamental forces 
as being in harmony with the phenomena given in these experiences. Instead of inventing – or 
dreaming up – the ground, Kant wants to use hypotheses that are based upon these common 
experiences. Interestingly, it is not that which is experienced (the sense data) that leads to 
confusions. Rather the observations are obscured through the presuppositions of reason, which 
Kant earlier in the “Dreams Essay” calls “delusions of reason.”xxviii 
 The emphasis on “agreement and uniformity” will prove to be an important step in the 
direction of the Copernican Revolution, since these universal and agreeable aspects of 
experiences – instead of the objects experienced – will become the subject of philosophical, or 
metaphysical, investigation. In the earlier discussed perspectives we found an emphasis on the 
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“personal” or “individual” role of the spectator. This is a significant change in his thinking that 
shows a turn from the interest in individual or personal perspectives that can be altered (as in the 
essay on motion and rest) to an interest in universal (objective) perspectives of the subject. In 
other words, Kant becomes here interested in human knowledge as such, which can be seen as a 
prelude to his question concerning the limitations of human knowledge and as a first formulation 
of his transcendental philosophy. He starts to focus on the universality of experiences, and shifts 
from objects to subjective structures of knowledge.  
Even while Kant’s essay on Swedenborg is still far removed from a transcendental philosophy 
that is concerned with the possibilities and limitations of human knowledge, we do find a 
problem in this essay, that will prove to be crucial in the development of his system. This 
problem pertains to the mistakes of the spirit-seer who confuses the inner and outer world. This 
problem translates into Kant’s distinction between a material world of objects and the a priori 
world that does not lie in the objects experienced, but in the subject that experiences these 
objects. One could say, that it is the main objective of Kant’s critical philosophy to make clear 
distinctions between these two worlds, i.e. to discover the a priori principles by separating them 
from that which is given through experience. The difficulty of this task is that the a priori 
principles cannot be investigated without experience – they are only at work in the act of 
experiencing. An actual experience, or intuition, is therefore a mix of both sensory data and a 
priori principles.  Through the analysis of Swedenborg Kant makes clear that it is the task of 
philosophy to separate “that which is given” in an experience from the subjective principles that 
are at work in processing the empirical data of experience.  
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Towards a Critical Philosophy: The Dissertation 
The “Dreams-essay” has introduced us to an important methodological device in which the 
subjective origins of experience are discovered through experience itself. While the subjective 
origins (which make experience possible) need to be separated from that which is experienced 
(the sense data) we can only obtain access to these origins through the act of experiencing. Kant 
applies this same method in his dissertation of 1770. He, nevertheless, develops a much more 
systematic approach, first of all, by introducing the forms of time and space as pure subjective 
principles. Similar to the above-discussed essays the perspective of the observer is playing an 
active role in determining “that which is observed.” In the “Dreams-essay” Kant already started 
to emphasize the a priori principles and the necessity of hypotheses based upon uniform and 
agreed experiences. In the dissertation he focuses completely upon those aspects of the observer 
that are a priori and universal to all experience. The main discovery here is that the forms of 
time and space are pure subjective principles which, so to speak, make it impossible to observe 
the object in an objective way. 
In this work Kant is mainly concerned with the problem of composing a world as a totality out 
of the compounds that together form this world. Kant’s project is what he calls a “propaedeutic 
to metaphysics” and a “search for a method”xxix Ultimately, in order to get beyond the status of 
propaedeutic, his system has to answer the question how the intelligible world of concepts of 
“the things which exist in themselves”xxx and the sensible world of phenomena are related to one 
another.  While he maintains a distinction between a material and immaterial world, the 
intelligible world here is – other than in the “Dreams-essay of” 1766 – to be understood as a 
realm of abstract ideas. The mind is assigned to think or to “entertain” these ideas. The faculty of 
understanding, on the other hand, has two different uses: the real use in which “the concepts, 
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whether of things or relations, are given,”xxxi and a logical use by which these concepts are 
“subordinated to each other.”xxxii This logical use subordinates sensitive cognitions to other 
sensitive cognitions and to concepts. Sensations consist of two parts: matter and form. Matter is 
the sensation, i.e. the sensory part of the sensation; form is “the aspect […] of sensible things 
which arises […] as the various things which affect the senses are co-ordinated by a certain 
natural law of the mind.”xxxiii This formal aspect that follows a natural law of the mind, which is 
stable and innate, requires “an internal principle in the mind,”xxxiv which brings together the 
different perceived qualities of an object. This means that objects are not sensed according to “an 
outline or any kind of schema of the object.”xxxv The sensible representation of the object 
depends upon “the nature of the subject.”xxxvi The object can only be sensed in so far as the 
subject can be touched by the object. Instead of the object, it is now the way in which the subject 
can know these objects that becomes the central focus.  
The main question in Kant’s dissertation is, how the logical use (which subordinates concepts) 
and the real use (which provides concepts) of the understanding are related. The difficulty in 
relating these two uses of the understanding lies in the fact that Kant here still thinks of the 
genesis of concepts as always being sensitive. Kant states in a cryptic formulation that the 
concept is not abstracted from the sensitive, but it (actively) abstracts from the sensitive.xxxvii 
This means that it is not the case that concepts are already contained in the sensation (out of 
which they can be abstracted) but they are, so to speak, developed though a contemplation 
triggered by sensation. “Sensitive cognitions are subordinated by the logical use of the 
understanding to other sensitive cognitions.”xxxviii Yet their origin or, as Kant writes “genesis” is 
sensitive: “it is of the greatest importance here to have noticed that cognitions must always be 
treated as sensitive cognitions, no matter how extensive their logical use of the understanding 
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may have been in relation to them.”xxxix Concepts are not pre-existing a priori principles but 
rather a priori structures that are generated through experience. 
We encounter here the main difficulty of the Dissertation. Kant attempts to set up a 
metaphysics that works with a priori principles, which are not quite a priori, since these 
concepts are acquired through experience. On the one hand, concepts, such as space and time, 
are regarded as subjective forms that determine the perception of the object. Space and time are 
not objective or real; they are not substances, accidents, or relations, but they are subjective and 
ideal, or pure intuitions of the subject.xl Kant makes here – as we could call it – an important 
paradigm-shift, as he is not any longer determining the different aspects of the object as pure 
qualities of the object.xli Instead, the observing subject plays a more important role in 
determining the qualities of the object. However, the concepts are not yet determined as pure a 
priori. Instead, the Dissertation determines space and time as pure intuitions, or formal 
principles of the sensible world. Space and time are therefore not general concepts – they are not 
containers or receptacles, as is the case with the representations of the understanding. Instead, 
they are: 
singular intuitions which are nonetheless pure. In these intuitions, the parts, 
and in particular, the simple parts do not, as the laws of reason prescribe, contain 
the ground of the possibility of a compound. But, following the paradigm of 
sensitive intuition, it is rather the case that the infinite contains the ground of each 
part which can be thought, and, ultimately, the ground of the simple, or, rather, of 
the limit.xlii 
Because of the limitless ground of these concepts they lie beyond the limits of reason. Being 
such infinite concepts, space and time give a ground to the different parts, i.e. the different 
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perceptions that necessarily fall under these concepts. Sensitive cognition provides then a basis 
for the understanding through a concept acquired through experience and reflection or 
contemplation. The concepts of space and time are thus necessarily acquired through experience, 
and are at the same time necessary for experience. This vague and problematic correlation 
between experience and concepts still needs to be elaborated by Kant.  
The empirical nature of the a priori principles is perhaps Kant’s main problem in the pre-
critical period, since he is unable to outline a clear relationship between concepts and experience. 
It is this problem that leads to Kant’s “period of silence” in which he does not publish anything 
for 11 years.xliii Kant refers to the problem in the famous Herz-letter of February 21, 1772 
(written during his “period of silence”): “how the faculty of the understanding achieves this 
conformity with the things themselves is still left in a state of obscurity.”xliv The dissertation 
shows us one of Kant’s problems: before the First Critique space and time are not considered as 
a priori structures that already exist before any experience as conditions for the possibility of 
experience, but they are acquired in the process of experience. While in the First Critique the 
acquisition of a priori structures through experience is refused (and, accordingly, Kant changes 
his method) in the dissertation he is lead to an ambiguous and problematic conception of the 
concepts of space and time. On the one hand, space and time are not perceived, but they are 
added to our perceptions in the process of sensitive cognition. On the other hand, space and time 
are not innate, but are developed in experience. Although innate laws of the mind join together 
the different sensations of objects, space and time do not (yet) have this status of being “innate”. 
This means that space and time are neither experienced nor a priori structures. This contorted 
and confusing ambiguity may explain why it took Kant such a long time to finish the First 
Critique. The problem for Kant during this time is not, as has been suggested by others, that 
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concepts still need to be developed. It is rather the case that a proper method with which these 
concepts can be given a foundation is lacking.xlv Ultimately, such a foundation will be the 
transcendental subject. 
The significance of the “ambiguous” discussion of space and time is that it brings to the fore 
the problem Kant was dealing with. The project of setting up a new metaphysics in which the 
subject is actively bringing concepts “into” objects is here still relying too much on the 
traditional conception of knowledge. Kant’s problem, in fact, shows how difficult it is – if 
possible at all – to start from a clean slate, that is, not to be determined by the tradition. The 
revolution in metaphysics itself has been accomplished in the sense that space and time are 
determined as subjective structures, but the ground of this subject –  as well as the concepts and 
the relation between the different faculties and uses of the faculties – has yet to be determined.  
 
The First Critique and the Completion of the Revolution 
Kant’s problem of how exactly the concepts of space and time come into existence is in the 
Critique of Pure Reason resolved by discussing these concepts as pure a priori structures. In the 
dissertation, as discussed above, time and space are acquired through experience and at the same 
time make experience possible. In the First Critique space and time, as well as all other a priori 
concepts still need empirical input in order to create knowledge, or even in order for them to 
function in the first place. However, the main difference with the dissertation is that the existence 
of these structures is completely independent from experience, as Kant proposes a subject that 
possesses a priori structures.  
The Critique of Pure Reason starts with a discussion of a priori knowledge in the 
“Transcendental Aesthetic,” “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility.”xlvi Sensibility is 
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here understood in the same way as in the dissertation: appearances are divided into matter and 
form, and the understanding is the faculty (1) that thinks the intuitions and (2) from which 
concepts arise.xlvii In the First Critique the forms of space and time are not abstracted in the 
process of intuition (as in the dissertation). They rather lie a priori in the mind as pure forms, i.e. 
in them is nothing that belongs to sensation. Space and time are neither sensed, nor does the 
understanding think space and time explicitly, but they are, instead, pure forms of sensibility. 
These forms, so to speak, order the matter that we receive from the senses.  
The purpose of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” is, first of all, to abstract everything the 
understanding adds through concepts to our sensations, and secondly, to bracket everything 
which belongs to sensation. After these procedures, only the mere form of appearances remains. 
Only these purely subjective forms of appearance are of interest to this transcendental method. In 
this new system Kant establishes the forms of space and time as purely a priori subjective 
principles that exist prior to any experience. The form of space determines relations between 
objects outside of the subject, and is, therefore, called the form of outer sense. Time is the inner 
sense “of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state.”xlviii Time is not dealing with outer 
appearances but “with the relation of representations in our inner state.”xlix Although space is 
thus – as opposed to time – an outer sense, since it determines things outside of the subject, it is 
nevertheless a subjective principle. An important – and famous – result of this is that since both 
space and time are not objective, but necessary subjective forms, the things in themselves cannot 
be known as they really are. All objects can only be known as they appear to the subject through 
the forms of time and space. This does not mean that the objects outside of the subject do not 
have an existence. It means that things can only be known to us in the way they are meaningful 
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to us, and that is through the pure forms of space and time. In other words, we cannot know the 
things outside of these subjective principles. 
Besides the forms of space and time Kant distinguishes the concepts of the understanding 
“which apply a priori to objects of intuition”l and which are logical functions with which the 
understanding can make judgments. These pure concepts of the understanding are the categories. 
One of the most important problems for Kant is how the different faculties and the concepts are 
united. In  the First Critique he solves this problem in the idea of the unity of apperception. This 
idea consists of the “I think” that can accompany all my representations. Kant’s justification of 
this new system in which the subject exists as a unity can be found in the “Transcendental 
Deduction” where he argues in favor of the existence of the “I think”  The method that we find 
here is radically different from the “Empirical Deduction” of the Dissertation. I cannot discuss 
all the intricacies of the deduction, but I will focus on the general nature of his method in order to 
show the radical change in direction Kant takes here. 
The “Transcendental Deduction” consists of a number of arguments that seek to establish the 
necessary origin of all knowledge. The term “deduction” does, for Kant, not mean to argue from 
the general to the particular; nor is a “deductive reasoning” an argument in which if the premises 
are true the conclusion must be true. Instead, Kant borrows the method from the juridical world.li 
A legal deduction establishes the validity of right of a legal claim (for example, the right to a 
certain property). These legal deductions were often set up before an actual conflict arises. They, 
therefore, do not deal with all kinds of facts and details, but rather determine the origin of certain 
rights. Similarly Kant wants to establish the validity of the a priori origins of knowledge. The 
Deduction establishes the right to the claim that certain origins of knowledge are entirely a 
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priori. Both the legal writings and Kant’s deduction are not full arguments, but rather a 
preparation for an argument, in the case of a conflict.  
In order to validate the usage of the categories in an a priori manner, Kant first of all needs to 
prove that the categories do indeed exist a priori, i.e. categories are not constituted through 
experience (as Kant argued in the pre-critical period, specifically in the dissertation). Instead, the 
categories form themselves the very possibility for any experience. Even while experience is still 
an essential part, Kant changes from emphasizing the necessity of experience to emphasizing the 
a priori nature of the categories. In the First Critique he, thus, emphasizes that a priori concepts 
are necessary for any meaningful experience. He validates the claim that categories exist a priori 
by arguing for the existence of a subjective origin of all our knowledge: an a priori synthetic 
unity that exists prior to any unity and makes experience possible through the unification of 
different intuitions and the usage of categories. Kant’s deduction as a whole consists of 
establishing this claim by arguing that if we would not have these a priori structures, knowledge 
would be impossible.  
In his dissertation, Kant explained the concepts of the understanding as being generated 
through experience. In the First Critique, Kant still emphasizes the importance of experience: 
without intuitions or representations the unity of apperception has nothing to accompany or to 
combine.lii If it cannot combine itself with representations it cannot be active at all. The radical 
difference with the dissertation is that now all these structures are truly a priori: space and time, 
and the categories are not generated through experience, but are at most – so to speak – 
awakened through experience. Experience is thus still required for the unity of apperception to 
reveal itself. In other words, the “I think” cannot think itself (as an analytical unity) without 
thinking also something other than itself. liii The latter implies that the “I think” thinks itself as a 
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synthetic unity. This means that it is not an absolute unity that exists independent of experience. 
Rather, it is a unity in relation to those things it combines. 
The “I think” is necessary for an intuition to become an object for me. Further, it is required 
that a manifold of intuitions through the transcendental unity of apperception “is united in a 
concept of the object.”liv The transcendental unity makes judgments, and in doing so it uses the 
categories as logical functions. Categories bring “the manifold of representation (be they 
intuitions or concepts) under one apperception.”lv Through the categories – which function as 
rules for the understanding – the manifold of an intuition is brought together. The categories are 
the logical functions of the understanding, which are independent of sensibility.lvi The categories 
do apply to objects of experience, but are not involved in intuition. They merely work in the act 
of combining intuitions as logical functions in judgement. 
It is not the aim of the deduction to prove the existence of the “I think” as a synthetic unity, 
but to demonstrate “the a priori validity of the categories in respect of all objects of our 
senses”lvii – the deduction is, after all, entitled “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts 
of the Understanding.”lviii Kant argues in the deduction, thus, through the existence of the “I 
think” for the a priori existence of the categories. The main aim of this discussion is to show that 
intuitions alone are not sufficient to create knowledge. While intuitions are required for 
knowledge, something else is necessary. A concept, which is not provided in the intuition, but 
which originates in the subject, is necessary as well. These concepts are ultimately grounded in 
the “I think” which provides a unity. 
The deduction, thus, points us to the foundation of the whole transcendental philosophy: the “I 
think.” This synthetic unity uses categories in its act of synthesizing the manifold of intuitions 
into judgments. Kant’s spectator has here truly become a subject. Kant’ subject is a structure of 
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knowledge – a thinking thing – which observes the objects outside of itself. While the spectators 
in the earlier works started their observation from particular presuppositions, or hypotheses about 
the external world, the subject is a universal structure.  It is not any longer simply a human being 
who observes and uses presupposition, and in doing so determines part of the objects observed. 
Rather, the Kantian subject is determined theoretically in the I think, which provides a unity and 
the very possibility of all observations. It is striking that these characteristics of the subject are 
the same issues Kant examined in the pre-critical writings that dealt with the spectator. The 
Kantian subject is certainly characterized as a spectator who does not merely observe the truth, 
but is actively determining the truth. The pre-critical writings lack a systematic treatment of the 
spectator and do not discuss universal but rather some random presuppositions. For that reason 
the pre-critical writings do not constitute a subject.  
 
The Copernican Revolution 
While Kant completes his system in 1781, a reflection on what he has actually accomplished 
appears 6 years later in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason of 1787. 
In this preface he introduces the famous idea of a Copernican revolution in metaphysics in which 
he again discusses a spectator. lix Copernicus’ “first hypothesis” was that, instead of “explaining 
the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the 
spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve 
and the stars to remain at rest.”lx Similar to Copernicus, Kant has turned the relationships 
between object and spectator around. While in traditional metaphysics knowledge originates in 
experience and our intuitions conform to objects, Kant suggests that objects conform to our 
intuition. Kant presents his own method as an experiment inspired by Copernicus’ hypothesis. 
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The subject – the spectator – becomes active, while the object remains at rest. This idea was, in 
fact, already accomplished in the dissertation of 1770. Yet, what is accomplished in the First 
Critique is a systematic foundation for this idea. 
The second preface, however, is indicating an even more radical standpoint. Six years earlier, 
in the preface of 1781, Kant admits that we cannot know the things themselves, but at least 
reason can investigate itself and work with pure principles. “ I have made completeness my chief 
aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been 
solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied.”lxi Here we still find 
the hope that reason can at least still discover the truth of itself. It is the tribunal of pure reason 
“which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions.”lxii The 
second edition preface takes on a completely different tone in this regard. Kant here namely 
recognizes that reason finds only what it is looking for. Using several scientific discoveries as 
examples, he states “reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own.” 
lxiii Scientific discoveries only occur after certain experiments that already start with certain 
presupposition. It is true that “reason must approach nature in order to be taught by it.”lxiv Yet, 
reason “must not do so in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher 
chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witness to answer questions which he 
has himself formulated.”lxv While Kant in the first edition describes reason as a tribunallxvi in the 
second edition reason has stepped down to the level of a judge that can be taught by nature. 
While the tribunal of the first edition seems to find the truth, the judge of the second edition is 
limited: it only discovers those things s/he asks questions about and does not find anything 
outside of the things s/he is investigating. While presuppositions seem limiting, those are also 
necessary, since without a hypothesis reason is not observing at all. Without an idea of what it is 
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looking for, reason cannot organize the data it receives from the senses in any meaningful way. 
This implies that reason always starts from a theory before the actual observation occurs. 
Theories and hypotheses do not originate from that which is observed, but the observations are 
organized and given meaning in the context of a theory. Within this framework a revolution in 
metaphysics then involves a new hypothesis from which we start our investigations. As such, 
reason can observe from a different perspective. The Copernican revolution is precisely this 
proposal for a change of perspective, in which the formal structures of knowledge itself become 
the object of knowledge. 
In1787 Kant has recognized the limitations to the idea that reason is a spectator. Reason does 
not only use hypotheses in observing the world outside of itself. Rather, any observation, 
including the observation of itself, starts from hypotheses. Since reason observes itself also 
through hypotheses, it is impossible to observe itself in an objective way. What we are left with 
is the possibility to change the hypotheses, and the Copernican Revolution is exactly that: an 
experiment that attempts to explain reality with a new set of concepts. To introduce the subject 
as an active component, while leaving the objects at rest, is an experiment that might make it 
easier to explain reality as it appears to us. 
The complications of the revolution come to the fore in § 24 in the B-Deduction where Kant 
discusses a paradox. Inner sense, time, does not only represent objects as they appear to us, Kant 
explains, but also we ourselves are represented through inner sense, and hence I appear to myself 
in a passive way: not as I am in myself, but how I am for myself, i.e. how I appear to myself, 
mediated through the form of inner sense. In doing so, I perform an act upon myself, in which I 
remain passive.lxvii Hence, “[w]e know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in 
itself.”lxviii  
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The conclusion that we cannot obtain objective knowledge of ourselves, is to be regarded as a 
necessary and ultimate result of the development of the role of the subject as a spectator. Nothing 
outside of this spectator can be really known, but also this spectator itself can only be observed 
with its own “eyes.” Even while the subject can change its hypotheses from which its 
observations start, such a change will never get beyond the realm of experiments. For, a 
hypothesis can never overcome its status as hypothesis. It always remains a particular 
perspective of the spectator. Hence also the structures of knowing discussed in the First Critique 
form merely a hypothesis, even while it is hypothesized that these are universal and can be found 
in every human being. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have analyzed Kant’s development of the subject starting in his pre-critical 
writings and into the First Critique. We have seen how Kant initially focuses upon the role the 
spectator plays in determining observed objects. While this role of the spectator is playing a 
crucial role in the idea of the transcendental subject, it has also become clear that Kant’s thinking 
encountered many obstacles in developing the subject as an active unity that determines the 
objects  it observes. The idea of an observer who changes perspectives is simply put not radical 
enough and throughout the Dissertation Kant remains – against his wish – too much involved in 
the kind of metaphysics that he wants to overcome. While he regards the subject as a spectator, 
objectivity outside of the subject is still too prevalent in the pre-critical writings. It is the idea of 
the “I think” and the a prior concepts that can eventually let Kant formulate his new philosophy. 
The development that I have analyzed in this paper has several important consequences. First 
of all, we can recognize how Kant was continually searching for a new system that could 
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revolutionize the way we grasp ourselves in relation to the objects we know. While the ideas of 
this revolution were certainly materialized at the time of his Dissertation, the theoretical 
foundation for those ideas needed much more time. Secondly, Kant’s notion of the unity of 
apperception is an important part of the answer to his theoretical problems. The “I think” brings 
a unity which founds the observing subject, and in doing so actively determines that which is 
observed. The most important idea of this unity is that it is presupposed a priori; it is not 
constituted by experience, as Kant (following the tradition) was initially thinking. Thirdly, Kant 
in the second preface of the First Critique recognizes the limitations of his revolution in 
metaphysics. By determining the subject as an active component in the act of knowing, the 
subject is also active in determining itself. With that recognition – the ultimate result of the 
Copernican Revolution – Kant has to admit that we cannot find the truth and leave the errors of 
the past behind, but that we can only make attempts at explaining reality in a better manner than 
we did before. 
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i I will use the following abbreviations for works published in The Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant.  
Correspondence = Kant, I (1999), Correspondence, Arnulf Zweig (tr. and ed.), The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, New York. 
Dreams = Kant, I (1999) ‘Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics’ in: 
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755 - 1770, David Walford (tr. and ed.) The Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant, New York. In the page references the second number refers to the 
Akademie Ausgabe. 
Dissertation = Kant, I. (1999), ‘On the Forms and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible 
World’ in: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755 - 1770, David Walford (tr. and ed.) The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, New York. 
ii Frederick Beiser, for example, writes that “from the very beginning of his career Kant was 
concerned with the foundation and limits of knowledge” Beiser 1992: 36. 
iii Werkmeister points out that in the “Dreams-Essay” Kant argues that “metaphysical 
speculations are worthless and, in effect, a waste of time, unless we first develop an adequate 
epistemological basis and a dependable method for philosophical inquiries” Werkmeister 1980: 
45. 
iv Only the “Dissertation” is considered to be a first formulation of the Copernican Revolution. 
Beck, for example writes that the dissertation “contains the first stage of the Copernican 
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Revolution: objects appear to us by conformity to the sensitive conditions of our experience of 
them” Beck 1989: 23. 
v Descartes 1993: 13 / 18 
vi Ibid. 14 / 18. 
vii Subjecting previous thoughts to doubt is perhaps one of the most significant characteristics of 
modernity, the age in which every scientific discovery reduces earlier times to mere idiocy. 
viii My own translation of : “aller erlernten Begriffe vergessen zu machen und den Weg zur 
Wahrheit ohne einen andern Führer als die blosse gesonde Vernunft von selber anzutreten.” Kant 
1922: 18. 
ix (My own translation of:) “Nun kann ich einen Körper in Beziehung auf gewisse äußere 
Gegenstände, die ihn zunächst umgeben, betrachten, und denn werde ich, wenn er diese 
Beziehung nicht ändert, sagen, er ruhe.” Kant 1922: 18 
x This example is probably inspired by Aristotle’s discussion of a boat in a river in which the 
river is determined as moving (Aristotle 1998: 212a). 
xi My own translation of the following: “Bald darauf sehe ich aus dem Schiffe nach dem Ufer hin 
und merke, daß das Tau, womit es befestiget war, aufgeknüpft sei, und das Schiff langsam den 
Strom herabtreibe; ich sage alsbald: die Kugel bewegt sich und zwar von Morgen gegen Abend 
nach der Richtung des Flusses“ Kant 1922: 18.  
xii Kant 1922: 19. 
xiii Also Aristotle discusses the movement of the celestial bodies, just after the example of the 
ship.  
xiv Kant 1922: 18. 
xv Dreams: 316 / Ak 2: 329. 
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xvi Dreams: 319 / Ak 2: 332.  
xvii Dreams: 349 / Ak 2: 363. 
xviii Dreams: 350 / Ak 2: 363. 
xix Dreams: 348/9 / Ak 2:362. 
xx Dreams: 345 / Ak 2: 359. 
xxi Dreams: 344 /  Ak 2:358. Walford translates “reinen, abgesonderten Betrachtungen” with 
“pure, abstract observations,” missing the crucial distinction Kant makes here between 
observations and contemplations, i.e. the work of the senses and the work of reason. Here he is 
clearly talking about the latter. Kant also emphasizes here that the contemplations are not yet put 
together. “Abgesondert” can mean here either that the contemplations are secluded from sensible 
observations, or that the contemplations are secluded from one another and not yet put into a 
complete theory. 
xxii This distinction between a priori principles and a posteriori ends is related to the confusion 
of the inner and the outer world by the spirit-seer Swedenborg. He namely has already a 
complete theory when starting with his observations of the spirits. This is not a trick in order to 
deceive the reader, but he is rather misleading his own observations. Instead of starting with an a 
posteriori end in his a priori contemplations (the strategy of Kant’s colleagues), Swedenborg 
makes observations without any a priori contemplations. This causes him to confuse the inner 
and the outer world, and this leads to mistakes in his observations. 
xxiii Dreams: 357 / 2:371. 
xxiv Ibid. 
xxv Dreams: 358 / Ak 2:372. 
xxvi Dreams: 357 / Ak 2:371. 
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xxvii  Dreams: 358 / Ak 2:372. 
xxviii Dreams: 347 / Ak 2:361. 
xxix Dissertation: 415 / Ak 2:419. 
xxx Dissertation: 391 / Ak 2:398. 
xxxi Dissertation: 385 / Ak 2:393. 
xxxii Ibid. 
xxxiii Dissertation: 384 / Ak 2: 392/3. 
xxxiv Dissertation: 385 / Ak 2:393. 
xxxv Ibid. 
xxxvi Ibid. 
xxxvii Dissertation: 386 / Ak 2: 394. 
xxxviii Dissertation: 385 / Ak 2: 393. 
xxxix Dissertation: 385 / Ak 2: 393. 
xl Dissertation: 393/7 / Ak 2: 400 (time) / Ak 2: 403 (space). 
xli Kant still employs what he later determines as an “empirical deduction,” which traces the 
origin of an object in experience. The method used in his Dissertation is the method of 
abstracting the a priori principles from what is empirically given. This method is rejected in the 
First Critique when he distinguishes an empirical deduction and a transcendental deduction. An 
empirical deduction, “shows the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience and 
through reflection upon experience” (Kant 1965: 121 / A 85). This is a description of Kant’s own 
method in the Dissertation (as well as the “Dreams-essay”). 
xlii Dissertation: 399 / Ak 2: 405. 
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xliii The next work after publishing the Dissertation in 1770 is the First Critique (1781). While 
one could argue that such a work requires at least 11 years of work, the fact of the matter is that 
Kant writes Marcus Herz on several occasions that he is almost finished with his project: he 
hopes to finish by Easter 1774 (in a letter written toward the end of 1773), in the summer of 1777 
(November 24, 1776), “this summer” (Early April 1778), and  “soon”  (August 28, 1778). 
Correspondence 139-169 / AK 10:143 – 10:241. 
xliv Correspondence, 134 / Ak 10: 121. 
xlv I agree in this regard with Paul Guyer, who writes that in the dissertation and the period “up to 
1770 [Kant] had not simply overlooked the problem of the categories; rather he just did not know 
how to solve it” (Guyer 1992: 128). Lewis White Beck, on the other hand, claims that the issue 
in the dissertation is not “how a priori concepts must be applicable to sensible objects” (the 
problem of the First Critique) but rather “how there can be a priori knowledge of intelligibilia 
without intellectual intuition” (Beck 1989: 22). I agree that the latter is a problem, but Beck does 
not seem willing to admit that there is a problem with the concepts already in the dissertation. I 
argue here that Kant can only find a solution to “the problem of the concepts” by turning to the 
question “how a priori concepts must be applicable to sensible objects.” Kant’s solution is to take 
the concepts as pure a priori.  
xlvi Kant 1965: 66 / A 21. 
xlvii Kant 1965: 65 / A 19. 
xlviii Kant 1965: 77 / A33. 
xlix Ibid. 
l Kant 1965: 113 / A79 / B105. 
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li For a discussion of the legal Deduktionsschriften (“Deduction writings”) and Kant’s use of this 
legal method, See Henrich 1989: 29-46.  
lii Kant 1965: B 135. 
liii An analytic unity requires or presupposes a synthetic unity. In note a of B133/4 Kant gives the 
example of an analytic unity, “red in general” which can only be represented by thinking a red 
object, i.e. by combing “red” with other representations. The unity of the ‘I think” can similarly 
only be thought through combination with other representations. I can think only this analytic 
unity “by means of a presupposed possible synthetic unity” (Kant 1965: 154 / B 133, note a). 
liv Kant 1965: 157 / B139. 
lv Kant 1965: 160 / B 143. 
lvi Kant 1965: 160 / B 144. 
lvii Kant 1965: 161 / B 145. 
lviii Kant 1965: 151 / B 129. 
lix One could argue that the spectator remains an important topic for Kant throughout his 
philosophy. The idea that the subject is spectator who is central and not a passive observer can, 
for example, also be found in Der Streit der Facultäten (1798) where the enthusiasm in the 
observer is more important than what happens on the stage of history. 
lx Kant 1965: 22 / B xvi/xvii. 
lxi Kant 1965: 10 / A xiii. 
lxii Kant 1965: 9 / A xi/xii. 
lxiii Kant 1965: 20 / B xiii 
lxiv Ibid. 
lxv Ibid. 
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lxvi Kant 1965: 9 / Axii. 
lxvii Kant 1965: 165 / B152. 
lxviii Kant 1965: 168 / B156. 
